Once upon a time, there was an article in Vanity Fair. The article was a sensationalized version of "Why are airlines using foreign MRO's for their heavy maintenance". The gist of it was that airlines were farming out all of their heavy maintenance to places like China; where they were having it done with little to no oversight, especially from the FAA (who has cut back their international MRO monitoring in recent years).
I don't recall what point I was trying to prove here, but I wrote up some observations anyways.
Vanity Fair article link, for reference:
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/11/airplane-maintenance-disturbing-truth?mbid=social_cp_facebook_wir
There is a pretty thoughtful discussion going on regarding this Vanity Fair article, on +Irreverent Monk 's post, in the comments. Here is my latest contribution to whet your appetite:
I would also say, that there is a lack of real leadership from the FAA, and the aircraft and engine manufacturers.
I say this because of the way everything has gotten so damned vague, with regards to which criteria, or procedures, mechanics and inspectors are supposed to be using in the field. This isn't true in all cases, but it happens enough that it frustrates me.
Using the American Airlines Flight 191 DC-10 crash from 1979 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_191
that was mentioned as an example: There were three airlines (at least major ones) using the technique of removing pylon & engine as one assembly for maintenance. One airline used an overhead crane method, while the other two used a forklift method. McDonnell Douglas refused to either approve or condemn either method of doing this, as they said "It wasn't their place to approve or disapprove of customer maintenance practices". Add to this that there were likely engineers at all three airlines, who said "Yup, it's fine" to the practices. And add the FAA, who are often more a reactionary oversight presence; only getting involved when something bad happens.
It all adds up to the real potential for an accident. Which is exactly what happened in this case.
Getting back to the manuals I mentioned, and I'll use it in context of working with a jet engine; When you work with aircraft, there are several manuals you work with reference to. You, as a mechanic, are always working under the umbrella of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's); which guide you to use manufacturer approved, or other practices accepted/approved by the administrator (which is your FAA office). You can use the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) to maintain or perform maintenance on the engine. And there is criteria in there to do so.
However, which manual do you go to after you take the engine off the airplane? The AMM? Or the Engine Service Manual (ESM)?
In our case, our airline's General Maintenance Manual (GMM, and itself an FAA _accepted- , but NOT approved manual, which absolves the FAA of some of the responsibility for us following it) specifies that when an engine is removed, but stays within close proximity to the aircraft, such as in the hangar, or not far away outside; we still use the AMM. But when it is trucked across the field to the engine shop; then the ESM takes precedence.
Why is this an issue? Because the AMM, and the ESM often have different acceptance criteria for any given defect found on the engine. For example; Just yesterday, I ran into an issue, where the AMM says, for a certain part, "Fretting and corrosion is permitted on the spacer". Not giving any limits on it either.
But if I go to the ESM, regarding the same exact part; it states that any fretting is unacceptable and is not repairable; and that while corrosion to a certain depth is acceptable, pitting is not.
The reason I point that out, that there is often conflicting information authority for our maintenance practices; is that I think that the FAA and the aircraft/engine/component manufacturers need to step up, and give clearer guidance for the maintenance and repair of their products.
Of course, this would mean that they would have to accept more responsibility for the practices that they endorse. Which is why they leave things so vague to begin with.
All the finger pointing that happens after an accident or incident is quite comical to see. Usually ending with a fine issued for the airline or manufacturer; and the hammer coming down on a mechanic and inspector, whose names were signed on the line.
They'll still do lots of heavy maintenance at their heavy bases, or at Repair Stations stateside. But when they need more work, at a cheaper price, performed; that's when they send work to China (for example).
Almost an overflow type situation.
Generally ,aviation maintenance is not as complicated as people think. Maintenance does take mechanical skills and a certain amount of reasoning but generally you follow the written procedures.
I don't recall what point I was trying to prove here, but I wrote up some observations anyways.
Vanity Fair article link, for reference:
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/11/airplane-maintenance-disturbing-truth?mbid=social_cp_facebook_wir
There is a pretty thoughtful discussion going on regarding this Vanity Fair article, on +Irreverent Monk 's post, in the comments. Here is my latest contribution to whet your appetite:
I would also say, that there is a lack of real leadership from the FAA, and the aircraft and engine manufacturers.
I say this because of the way everything has gotten so damned vague, with regards to which criteria, or procedures, mechanics and inspectors are supposed to be using in the field. This isn't true in all cases, but it happens enough that it frustrates me.
Using the American Airlines Flight 191 DC-10 crash from 1979 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_191
that was mentioned as an example: There were three airlines (at least major ones) using the technique of removing pylon & engine as one assembly for maintenance. One airline used an overhead crane method, while the other two used a forklift method. McDonnell Douglas refused to either approve or condemn either method of doing this, as they said "It wasn't their place to approve or disapprove of customer maintenance practices". Add to this that there were likely engineers at all three airlines, who said "Yup, it's fine" to the practices. And add the FAA, who are often more a reactionary oversight presence; only getting involved when something bad happens.
It all adds up to the real potential for an accident. Which is exactly what happened in this case.
Getting back to the manuals I mentioned, and I'll use it in context of working with a jet engine; When you work with aircraft, there are several manuals you work with reference to. You, as a mechanic, are always working under the umbrella of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's); which guide you to use manufacturer approved, or other practices accepted/approved by the administrator (which is your FAA office). You can use the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) to maintain or perform maintenance on the engine. And there is criteria in there to do so.
However, which manual do you go to after you take the engine off the airplane? The AMM? Or the Engine Service Manual (ESM)?
In our case, our airline's General Maintenance Manual (GMM, and itself an FAA _accepted- , but NOT approved manual, which absolves the FAA of some of the responsibility for us following it) specifies that when an engine is removed, but stays within close proximity to the aircraft, such as in the hangar, or not far away outside; we still use the AMM. But when it is trucked across the field to the engine shop; then the ESM takes precedence.
Why is this an issue? Because the AMM, and the ESM often have different acceptance criteria for any given defect found on the engine. For example; Just yesterday, I ran into an issue, where the AMM says, for a certain part, "Fretting and corrosion is permitted on the spacer". Not giving any limits on it either.
But if I go to the ESM, regarding the same exact part; it states that any fretting is unacceptable and is not repairable; and that while corrosion to a certain depth is acceptable, pitting is not.
The reason I point that out, that there is often conflicting information authority for our maintenance practices; is that I think that the FAA and the aircraft/engine/component manufacturers need to step up, and give clearer guidance for the maintenance and repair of their products.
Of course, this would mean that they would have to accept more responsibility for the practices that they endorse. Which is why they leave things so vague to begin with.
All the finger pointing that happens after an accident or incident is quite comical to see. Usually ending with a fine issued for the airline or manufacturer; and the hammer coming down on a mechanic and inspector, whose names were signed on the line.
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Then there were some addendums, and comment questions and answers afterwards:
Addendum: Another facet of outsourcing that the article forgot to mention: Is that many airlines and operators are employing a significant percentage of their maintenance staff through contracting agencies, rather than directly for the company.
Beyond the cost savings that can be had with an ebb and flow workload; this unfortunately fosters a situation where unskilled or plain shit mechanics can linger in the system, floating from job to job. Often with no links, or heads up, to the next company he/she is sent to about why they let the contractor go from the hangar.
Was the contract at an end? Or were there discipline problems? Skill issues?
"Who knows? Who cares? We need a warm body to perform some man hours of work on the upcoming heavy check." Seems to be the attitude of a lot of places.
Beyond the cost savings that can be had with an ebb and flow workload; this unfortunately fosters a situation where unskilled or plain shit mechanics can linger in the system, floating from job to job. Often with no links, or heads up, to the next company he/she is sent to about why they let the contractor go from the hangar.
Was the contract at an end? Or were there discipline problems? Skill issues?
"Who knows? Who cares? We need a warm body to perform some man hours of work on the upcoming heavy check." Seems to be the attitude of a lot of places.
Q in reference to the VF article's mention of airline maintenance practices and outsourcing: I wonder about how true this actually is because the impression given to me was that Delta did all of it's major work at TOC in Atlanta and in the old NWA facilities at MSP, US Air did things at PHX and other major bases and SWA and American did theirs wherever their major bases are.
A : A lot of the work contracted overseas, doesn't comprise an airline's whole fleet.
They'll still do lots of heavy maintenance at their heavy bases, or at Repair Stations stateside. But when they need more work, at a cheaper price, performed; that's when they send work to China (for example).
Almost an overflow type situation.
Another Question-ish comment : I have been to Aeroman in El Salvador and other MRO's throughout the world. I can't say I have ever found foreign MRO's too be "disturbing" .
One point that the article leaves out is that in the cases I have been involved with, the Airlines have a team of inspectors on sight too over see quality. Although the MRO in the end has legal responsibility to sign off tasks the Airline inspectors are involved with the process. Generally ,aviation maintenance is not as complicated as people think. Maintenance does take mechanical skills and a certain amount of reasoning but generally you follow the written procedures.
My Answer-ish comment: That is very true; the airlines DO send representatives along with their planes, to insure proper maintenance (and to reign in costs from being padded onto the bill). But that alone isn't perfect oversight either. As it is entirely dependent upon who you send to represent the airline. Send a lazy person, or a greedy person; and they'll let things slide through sloth or bribery. It has happened.
I stand by my opinion that if a foreign company does your work for you, then the FAA needs to be just as on top of them, as they are with a repair shop right next door to their offices. Give them the budget and the personnel to do it. If not, then don't allow that kind of foreign maintenance to happen. It's that simple.
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There was a much more official-y type response to the Vanity Fair article, from Aviation Pros; which I kind of think went too far in the other direction, in defense of the norm. But you can decide for yourself. Here is the link for that one:
https://www.aviationpros.com/press_release/12137217/contract-aviation-maintenance-safer-more-
efficient
And another response from Aviation Week, which is a little more measured:
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